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TORTS LAW
I. No PUNITIVE DAMAGES ALLOWED UNDER THE STATUTE CREATING
STRICT TORT LIABIITY
In Barnwell v. Barber-Colman Co.1 the South Carolina Supreme
Court held that plaintiffs may not recover punitive damages when their
sole claim for relief is under strict liability in tort.2 The issue came
before the supreme court on certification from the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of South Carolina. The jury had awarded
Barnwell $1,000,000 in actual damages and $2,800,000 in punitive dam-
ages for the injuries he received when he caught his hand in a piece of
textile machinery which allegedly had a defectively designed guard
that the defendant had manufactured.' The plaintiff tried the case
solely under section 15-73-10," in which the legislature created strict
liability in South Carolina when it adopted the Restatement (Second)
of Torts section 402A.5 Because section 15-73-10 does not expressly
provide for punitive damages, and refers only to compensation for
"physical harm caused,"6 the South Carolina Supreme Court felt
bound by the rules of statutory construction to limit the plaintiff's re-
covery to actual damages.1
This decision places South Carolina in a small minority of those
jurisdictions that have considered the issue.' Courts generally focus on
both the policy aspects of awarding punitive damages, which include
the inhibition of innovative design by manufacturers that are afraid of
increased liability, and whether the purpose of punitive damages to
punish is consistent with a no-fault concept of liability.' Because South
1. - S.C. -, 393 S.E.2d 162 (1989).
2. Id. at , 393 S.E.2d at 164.
3. Id. at -, 393 S.E.2d at 162. The defendant designed this particular guard to
move when an object approaches it. This allows the object to pass through the heavy
rollers of the warper machine. When the plaintiff attempted to retrieve a pair of scissors
that were caught in the warper machine, his hand was drawn into the rollers and was
damaged severely. Brief of Plaintiff at 4-5.
4. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
6. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-10(1) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
7. Barnwell, - S.C. at --, 393 S.E.2d at 163.
8. See Justice Finney's dissent for a list of case citations in states that award
punitive damages in strict liability. Id. at - n.1, 393 S.E.2d at 164 n.1.
9. See, e.g., Fischer v. Johns-Manville Corp., 193 N.J. Super. 113, 472 A.2d 577,
cert. granted, 97 N.J. 598, 483 A.2d 137, cert. granted sub nom. Fischer v. Bell Asbestos
1
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Carolina legislatively adopted strict liability, however, the issue was
statutory construction and legislative intent rather than the merits of
awarding punitive damages to plaintiffs.
In Martin v. Fleissner GMBIP0 the Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals anticipated the South Carolina Supreme Court's denial of puni-
tive damages under section 15-73-10. Although the Fourth Circuit did
not reach the issue, it noted that "absent express language, the [South
Carolina] state courts will not read an authorization of punitive dam-
ages into the statute.""' South Carolina courts traditionally have re-
fused to allow punitive damages under statutes that do not expressly
provide for punitive damages. 12 The courts reason that "[t]o depart
from the meaning expressed by the words is to alter the statute, to
legislate and not to interpret. ' 13 Thus, while the legislative adoption of
strict liability provided immediate relief to consumers, it also re-
strained the court's ability to interpret flexibly and to develop the
doctrine.
14
The general rule in South Carolina is that the courts must con-
strue strictly a statute that is in derogation of the common law.1 Thus,
the first question is whether section 15-73-10 is part of South Carolina
common law. South Carolina did not recognize strict liability until
1974.16 Justice Finney argued in dissent that the legislature intended
the statute to operate under the existing South Carolina tort common
law, which favors punitive damages.'7 He also asserted that the legisla-
ture did not intend to limit the type of recoverable damages when it
codified the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A, especially
Mines, Ltd., 97 N.J. 598, 483 A.2d 137 (1984), afl'd, 103 N.J. 643, 512 A.2d 466 (1986);
see also Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1257
(1976) (general discussion of the objectives of punitive damages and their relation to
strict liability).
10. 741 F.2d 61 (4th Cir. 1984).
11. Id. at 66.
12. See Laird v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 243 S.C. 388, 396-97, 134 S.E.2d 206, 210
(1964) (refused to recognize punitive damages under the Uninsured Motorist Act then
codified at S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 46-750.11, -750.14 to -750.18 (1962)); Garrick v. Florida
Cent. & Peninsula R.R., 53 S.C. 448, 453-59, 31 S.E. 334, 736-38 (1898) (refused to recog-
nize punitive damages under a statute that provided for damages in proportion to
injury).
13. Laird, 243 'S.C. at 395, 134 S.E.2d at 209 (quoting Creech v. South Carolina
Pub. Serv. Auth., 200 S.C. 127, 146, 20 S.E.2d 645, 652 (1942)).
14. Montgomery & Owen, Reflections on the Theory and Administration of Strict
Tort Liability for Defective Products, 27 S.C.L. REV. 803, 805-07 (1976).
15. See, e.g., Steinert v. Lanter, 284 S.C. 65, 66, 325 S.E.2d 532, 533 (1985); Stan-
dard v. Shine, 278 S.C. 337, 340, 295 S.E.2d 786, 787 (1982); Major v. National Indem.
Co., 267 S.C. 517, 520, 229 S.E.2d 849, 850 (1976).
16. Hatfield v. Atlas Enters., 274 S.C. 247, 262 S.E.2d 900 (1980).
17. Barnwell, - S.C. at -, 393 S.E.2d at 166 (Finney, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 42
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when other jurisdictions find strict liability compatible with an award
of punitive damages."'
The majority did not adopt this approach, however, and relied on
the language in Schall v. Sturm, Ruger Co.19 in which the supreme
court asserted that this statute "brought about a significant change in
the law of our state. '20 Furthermore, the court in SchalI stated that
"[i]t is fair to say that an entirely new species of action came into be-
ing with the adoption of Restatement 402A by our General Assem-
bly."21 In Schall the court refused to apply section 15-73-10 retroac-
tively in the absence of express language or clear legislative intent.
22
Thus, Schall provides that section 15-73-10 is a statute in derogation
of the common law and subject to strict interpretation.
2 3
Once the court made this determination, it could not extend the
statute's application beyond its legislative intent. Although the legisla-
ture adopted the comments to section 402A as the legislative intent of
section 15-73_10,4 the comments do not address the issue of punitive
damages. Thus, the court must give the words of the statute their plain
and ordinary meaning.2 5 The pertinent language of section 15-73-10
provides that "[o]ne who sells any product in a defective condition un-
reasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is sub-
ject to liability for physical harm caused to the ultimate user or con-
sumer, or to his property .... 112 The court determined that the plain
18. Id. at - 393 S.E.2d at 164-66 (Finney, J., dissenting). The legislature's adop-
tion of the official comments to the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A as the
legislative intent of section 15-73-10 enhances the credibility of the dissent's argument.
See S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-30 (Law. Co-op. 1976). Montgomery and Owen assert that
this allows the court to look to court decisions in other jurisdictions for their interpreta-
tions of section 402A. Montgomery & Owen, supra note 14, at 812. If the court had
adopted this approach, the court would have focused its inquiry on the compatibility of
punitive damages and strict liability and the useful function of punitive damages. See
Barnwell, - S.C. at -, 393 S.E.2d at 166. (Finney, J., dissenting). One criticism of this
approach toward punitive damages is that the cases on which the dissent relied do not
interpret section 402A to provide for punitive damages, but allow punitive damages be-
cause they are not inconsistent with strict liability and they serve a useful purpose. The
majority takes a better approach and relies on the traditional rules of statutory construc-
tion and concentrates on the plain and ordinary meaning of the words "for physical
harm caused," which are found in section 15-73-10. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-10 (Law. Co-
op. 1976).
19. 278 S.C. 646, 300 S.E.2d 735 (1983).
20. Id. at 648, 300 S.E.2d at 735.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 650, 300 S.E.2d at 737.
23. See id. at 649, 300 S.E.2d at 736.
24. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-30 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
25. Smith v. Eagle Constr. Co., 282 S.C. 140, 143, 318 S.E.2d 8, 9 (1984).
26. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-10(1) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
1990]
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meaning of these words limited damages to compensation for physical
harm and did not include punitive damages."'
In Laird v. Nationwide Insurance Co.28 the court considered a
similar issue and determined that damages for "bodily injury" do not
include punitive damages. In both Barnwell and Laird the court dis-
tinguished the purpose of actual damages from the purpose of punitive
damages. Punitive damages serve as a deterrent and seek to punish the
individual, while actual damages seek to compensate the individual for
the loss or injury sustained.29 Relying on this distinction in Laird, the
court held that damages for "bodily injury" sought only to compensate
the victim and do not include punitive damages.3 0 The same analysis
applies to Barnwell because the language in section 15-73-10 that cre-
ates liability for "physical harm caused" is indistinguishable from the
language the court considered in Laird.
The issue in this case is not whether South Carolina should award
punitive damages in strict liability, but whether the legislature has
provided for their recovery. Although the majority declines to assert
their position on punitive damages, they expressly invite the legislature
to amend the statute to allow punitive damages.31 Whether the legisla-
ture should amend the statute is beyond the scope of this article, but it
is important to note that on two other occasions the legislature has
amended a statute that the court determined did not provide for puni-
tive damages. 32
Although this decision precludes recovery of punitive damages, the
decision applies only to actions tried solely under section 15-73-10 and
will not limit recovery of punitive damages in products liability actions
that are tried under a negligence theory. Thus, the greatest impact of
this decision will be on a plaintiff who is contributorily negligent. The
plaintiff must forego the possibility of punitive damages to gain the
protection of strict liability, in which contributory negligence is not a
defense. The impact on other plaintiffs should be minimal, however,
for if a plaintiff can demonstrate the reckless and willful conduct to
support a punitive damages award under Rogers v. Florence Printing
27. Barnwell, - S.C. at -, 393 S.E.2d at 163.
28. 243 S.C. 388, 397, 134 S.E.2d 206, 210 (1964).
29. Barnwell, - S.C. at -, 393 S.E.2d at 163.
30. 243 S.C. at 396-97, 134 S.E.2d at 210 (1964).
31. Barnwell, - S.C. at -, 393 S.E.2d at 164.
32. Following the decision in Laird, the legislature amended the Uninsured Motor-
ist Act to allow for punitive damages. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-77-30(4) (Law. Co-op.
1989). The legislature also amended the Wrongful Death Act to allow for punitive dam-
ages following the court's decision in Garrick v. Florida Cent. & Peninsular R.R., 53 S.C.
448, 31 S.E. 334 (1898). See S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-51-40 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
[Vol. 42
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Co., 33 the plaintiff can show negligence to support the underlying tort
claim. Thus, unless the legislature acts to amend the statute, a plaintiff
must plead and prove negligence before punitive damages will be
awarded.
Lorie L. Maring
II. IMPLIED MALICE WILL NOT SUPPORT PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARD IN
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION SUIT
In Goodwin v. Metts34 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that malice may be inferred from lack of probable cause in a malicious
prosecution suit, but implied malice will not support a punitive dam-
ages award.3 5 In a related case, McKenney v. Jack Eckerd Co.,36 the
South Carolina Court of Appeals held that the solicitor's entry of a
nolle prosequi in favor of a defendant is not the type of sufficient ter-
mination required to support a claim for malicious prosecution.
3 7
In Goodwin James Goodwin and Eddie Hallman sued Lexington
County Sheriff James Metts. and Deputy Sheriff Vernon Maxwell for
wrongful prosecution under 42 U.S.C. § 198339 and under state law for
malicious prosecution. Goodwin and Hallman alleged that Maxwell and
Metts withheld exculpatory evidence during their prosecution for
grand larceny. Prior to trial, Maxwell learned that Terry Nelson, the
principal witness in the case, provided deputies with a false address
and could not be located. Furthermore, Maxwell cleared the case for
prosecution even though another man confessed to a string of burgla-
ries including a confession for the crime of which Goodwin and Hall-
man were accused. Maxwell failed to disclose these facts to the solicitor
or to the private attorney retained to prosecute the case.4 The court
held Maxwell liable on both the wrongful prosecution and malicious
prosecution claims and held Metts liable on only the malicious prose-
cution claim. The jury awarded compensatory damages of $60,000 to
Goodwin and $90,000 to Hallman. The jury also assessed punitive
33. 233 S.C. 567, 577-78, 106 S.E.2d 258, 263-64 (1958).
34. 885 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1812 (1990).
35. Id. at 166.
36. 299 S.C. 523, 386 S.E.2d 263 (Ct. App. 1989).
37. Id. at 524, 386 S.E.2d at 264.
38. Metts's liability is predicated on the South Carolina Sheriff's Statute. S.C.
CODE ANN. § 23-13-10 (Law. Co-op. 1989) (sheriff is responsible for a deputy's neglect of
duty or misconduct in office).
39. (1982).
40. Goodwin, 885 F.2d at 159-60.
1990]
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damages of $175,000 against Maxwell."' The Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals sustained the award of compensatory damages, but reversed
the award of punitive damages.'2
In South Carolina, it is well established that malice may be im-
plied by lack of probable cause in a malicious prosecution suit.'3 At
least twenty other jurisdictions also allow a jury to infer malice from
lack of probable cause." Thus, the decision in Goodwin is well sup-
ported by South Carolina courts and by courts in other jurisdictions.
The Goodwin opinion, however, is novel for its treatment of puni-
tive damages in a malicious prosecution suit. No prior South Carolina
case has dealt with the issue of punitive damages in this context. In
reversing the award of punitive damages, the Fourth Circuit borrowed
the distinction between actual and implied malice from South Carolina
libel and slander case law.'" Implied malice "is a presumption of law
and dispenses with the proof of malice .... By contrast, "actual
malice or malice in fact is not presumed and must be proved."' 7 Al-
though implied malice is sufficient to support an award of actual dam-
ages, an award of punitive damages requires actual malice.'8 The
Fourth Circuit's holding in Goodwin is a logical extension of South
Carolina law. The opinion follows the reasoning of other courts that
have required actual malice, rather than implied malice, to support a
punitive damages award in the context of a malicious prosecution
suit.4' Although Goodwin creates no dramatic changes in South Caro-
lina law and is only persuasive authority, it provides guidance about
how South Carolina courts might deal with the issue of punitive dam-
ages in future malicious prosecution suits.
In McKenney v. Jack Eckerd Co.50 the South Carolina Court of
Appeals held that entry of a nolle prosequi by the solicitor is not the
41. Id. at 160.
42. Id. at 166-67.
43. Ruff v. Eckerds Drugs, Inc., 265 S.C. 563, 566-67, 220 S.E.2d 649, 651 (1975);
Parrott v. Plowden Motor Co., 246 S.C. 318, 322, 143 S.E.2d 607, 609 (1965); Margolis v.
Telech, 239 S.C. 232, 238, 122 S.E.2d 417, 419 (1961); Elletson v. Dixie Home Stores, 231
S.C. 565, 571, 99 S.E.2d 384, 389 (1957); Melton v. Williams, 281 S.C. 182, 185, 314
S.E.2d 612, 614 (Ct. App. 1984).
44. See 54 C.J.S. Malicious Prosecution § 40, at 564 nn. 88-90 (1987).
45. Goodwin, 885 F.2d at 165-66.
46. Jones v. Garner, 250 S.C. 479, 488, 158 S.E.2d 909, 913 (1968) (quoting 33 Am
JuR. Libel and Slander § 111 (1941)).
47. Id., 158 S.E.2d at 914.
48. Id.
49. See Bradshaw v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 157 Ariz. 411, 421-22, 758
P.2d 1313, 1323-24 (1988); Harris v. Lewis State Bank, 482 So. 2d 1378, 1385 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1986); Lee v. Southland Corp., 219 Va. 23, 27, 244 S.E.2d 756, 759 (1978).
50. 299 S.C. 523, 386 S.E.2d 263 (Ct. App. 1989).
[Vol. 42
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type of termination of a criminal proceeding that will support a claim
for malicious prosecution. 1 Eckerd caused a warrant to be issued
charging McKenney with issuing a fraudulent check after McKenney's
bank erroneously dishonored McKenney's check.5 2 McKenney sued
Eckerd for malicious prosecution. The established rule in South Caro-
lina is that entry of nolle prosequi will not support an action for mali-
cious prosecution. South Carolina's rule appears to be at odds with
the rule in most jurisdictions that an entry of nolle prosequi is a termi-
nation sufficiently favorable to an accused to support a malicious pros-
ecution claim if the reasons for the entry indicate the innocence of the
accused and its entry is not based on a procedural or technical defect.
5 '
Sections 659, 660, and 661 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts ex-
press the majority view. Section 659 specifically states the majority
rule.55 Sections 660 and 661 discuss circumstances when a termination
other than by acquittal is not sufficient to support a claim for mali-
cious prosecution. 6 These two sections maintain that a termination of
criminal proceedings will be insufficient to support a claim for mali-
cious prosecution if the reasons for the termination do not indicate the
innocence of the accused. A number of cases from other jurisdictions
51. Id. at 524, 386 S.E.2d at 264.
52. Id.
53. Harrelson v. Johnson, 119 S.C. 59, 111 S.E. 882 (1922) (discharge by magistrate
after preliminary investigation will support malicious prosecution suit); Mack v. Riley,
282 S.C. 100, 102, 316 S.E.2d 731, 732 (Ct. App. 1984).
54. See 54 C.J.S. Malicious Prosecution § 56 (1987).
55. "Criminal proceedings are terminated in favor of the accused by ... the for-
mal abandonment of the proceedings by the public prosecutor .... " RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 659 (C) (1977). Comment e provides:
The usual method by which a public prosecutor signifies the formal abandon-
ment of criminal proceedings is by the entry of a nolle prosequi, either with or
without the leave of the court as the criminal procedure of the jurisdiction in
question provides .... In either case, unless new proceedings are instituted,
the formal abandonment of the proceedings by the public prosecutor is a final
termination in favor of the accused, except under the conditions stated in §§
660 and 661.
Id. § 659 comment e.
56. Section 660 provides:
A termination of criminal proceedings in favor of the accused other than by
acquittal is not a sufficient termination to meet the requirements of a cause of
action for malicious prosecution if
(a) the charge is withdrawn or the prosecution abandoned pursuant to
an agreement of compromise with the accused; or
(b) the charge is withdrawn or the prosecution abandoned because of
misconduct on the part of the accused or in his behalf for the purpose of
preventing proper trial; or
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have expressly stated or impliedly indicated that if the accused con-
sents to or procures the entry of a nolle prosequi, the termination is
not sufficient to support a malicious prosecution claim. 7 This restric-
tion is unfair to a person accused of a crime because to preserve a civil
cause of action the person must object to the abandonment of criminal
charges against him. If an accused fails to object to the entry of a nolle
prosequi, he loses his right to bring a malicious prosecution claim. Fur-
thermore, because a nole prosequi can be entered at anytime prior to
trial, jeopardy may not have attached. This leaves the accused without
the protection of either the double jeopardy clause or a civil cause of
action. An accused, therefore, could be subject to repeated harassment
without any means of redress. The value of this requirement is doubt-
ful, especially when the accused person is innocent.
In citing the majority rule, the McKenney opinion does not men-
tion the requirement that the entry of a nolle prosequi be over the
objection of the accused. 8 Perhaps the court of appeals is suggesting
that the supreme court adopt the majority rule without the objection
requirement. Indeed, the Restatement does not require the accused to
object to the entry of nolle prosequi.5 9 The Restatement view appears
to be the sounder view. Perhaps the supreme court, given the proper
case, will choose to adopt it.
Stephen P. Stewart
III. GENERAL STANDARD OF NEGLIGENCE APPLIES IN DETERMINING A
VEHICLE OWNER'S DUTY TO INSPECT A MECHANIC'S REPAIRS
In Carter v. R.L. Jordan Oil Co. 0 a negligence action, the South
Carolina Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' grant of a mo-
tion for directed verdict"1 on an evidentiary issue, which raised an in-
ference that the question of negligence should have been presented to
the jury.02 In dicta the supreme court expressly rejected the court of
57. See 1 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS § 4.4, at 418-20 n.5
(2d ed. 1986). See also 54 C.J.S. Malicious Prosecution § 56 (1987).
58. McKenney v. Jack Eckerd Co., 299 S.C. 523, 524, 386 S.E.2d 263, 264 (Ct. App.
1989).
59. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 659-60 (1986).
60. 299 S.C. 439, 385 S.E.2d 820 (1989) (per curiam).
61. Id. at 440, 385 S.E.2d at 820.
62. Id. Carter alleged that Jordan's driver negligently failed to perform the pre-trip
inspection recommended in the operator's manual. The court of appeals held that an-
other driver's testimony of his own pre-trip inspection was not relevant to prove the
owner's negligent pre-trip inspection of a trailer. Carter v. R.L. Jordan Oil Co., 294 S.C.
435, 447-49, 365 S.E.2d 324, 331-32 (Ct. App. 1988), rev'd, 299 S.C. 439, 385 S.E.2d 820"
[Vol. 42
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appeals' three-part test for concluding that a vehicle owner could rely
on a mechanic's repairs without further inspection by the owner and
reaffirmed the well-established general standard for the determination
of negligence.6 3
Samuel Carter was injured when a wheel assembly from a truck
owned by R.L. Jordan Oil Company broke loose and struck his van.
The wheel assembly was held in place by a nut, which was secured by a
cotter pin. Almost four months prior to the accident, a mechanic re-
moved the wheel assembly to repair the trailer's brakes. The mechanic
installed a used cotter pin instead of installing a new pin when he reas-
sembled the wheels. The evidence showed that the wheel separated be-
cause the weakened cotter pin broke."
At trial Carter alleged that Jordan failed to inspect the mechanic's
invoices and the mechanic's work on the trailer.6 5 The court of appeals
held that the owner of a motor vehicle has no duty to inspect the work
of mechanics after they complete maintenance or repairs if:
(1) the work is of a kind within the competence of the ordinary
mechanic performing that type of work; (2) the defect in the work is
not of a character that would make it apparent to a person of ordinary
prudence in the owner's position; and (3) the owner reasonably relies
on the competence of the mechanic as a sufficient assurance that the
vehicle is safe to operate.66
In establishing the three-part test, the court of appeals recognized
that the operator of a motor vehicle has a duty to make a reasonable
inspection of the vehicle to discover conditions that might present an
unreasonable risk of harm to others.1s The court reasoned, however,
that the ordinary prudent owner does not possess the mechanical skills
necessary to maintain a motor vehicle in a reasonably safe operating
condition and, therefore, would have a qualified mechanic service his
(1989). The supreme court reversed, holding that the driver's testimony could support an
inference of the practices of both the driver involved and other Jordan drivers. Carter,
299 S.C. at 440, 385 S.E.2d at 820.
63. Carter, 299 S.C. at 441, 385 S.E.2d at 820.
64. Carter, 294 S.C. at 438-40, 365 S.E.2d at 326-27 (court of appeals' opinion).
65. Id. at 445-47, 365 S.E.2d at 330-31. The trial judge dismissed Carter's cause of
action against Jordan for negligent hiring. Id. at 446 n.2, 365 S.E.2d at 331 n.2. Carter
also sued the mechanic for negligent repair of the trailer. The jury returned a general
verdict against Jordan and the mechanic for actual and punitive damages. The court of
appeals affirmed the verdict against the mechanic, but reversed the verdict against Jor-
dan. In Carter's suit against the manufacturer, the trial court directed a verdict for the
manufacturer. Id. at 439, 365 S.E.2d at 327.
66. Id. at 445, 365 S.E.2d at 330.
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vehicles.08 Furthermore, the ordinary owner does not have the knowl-
edge to make an adequate inspection, especially if it requires disassem-
bly of the vehicle. Therefore, the court concluded, the owner has a
right to rely on a qualified mechanic's work without further
inspection.60
The supreme court, however, rejected the court of appeals' "rigid
test" and reaffirmed the well-established general standard for the de-
termination of negligence.70 The general standard of negligence is the
failure to exercise due care. Due care is the care a reasonably prudent
person would exercise under the circumstances."1
The court of appeals recognized the vehicle owner's duty to make
a reasonable inspection, and the second part of the test incorporates
this inspection. Under the three-part test, the owner would not be held
liable if a reasonable inspection failed to uncover the defect. The test,
therefore, merely precluded the jury from requiring a more detailed
inspection specifically for the purpose of discovering defects in a
mechanic's work. Carter demonstrates that although the reasonably
prudent owner will not, in most circumstances, be expected to inspect
the work of a mechanic, the supreme court is unwilling to remove this
question from the jury.
The result of Carter is that one of the circumstances that juries
may consider in determining what is a reasonable inspection is whether
the vehicle has recently been serviced by a mechanic. Thus, in addition
to facts that are normally relevant in determining what constitutes a
reasonable inspection, such as the dangerousness of cargo to be trans-
ported, factors pertaining to the mechanic's work may now become rel-
evant. For example, certain defects are more likely than others to cause
serious harm. It may be that the reasonably prudent person would in-
spect the work done on the brakes but not on the vehicle's electrical
system. Juries also might want to consider the ease with which the in-
spection can be done. Although some defects are visible,7 2 others may
require elaborate disassembly in order to be revealed. The interval be-
tween the time the mechanic completed the work and the time the de-
fect appeared may also be relevant. If the defect could not possibly be
68. Id, at 445, 365 S.E.2d at 330.
69. Id. at 446, 365 S.E.2d at 330.
70. Carter v. Jordan Oil Co., 299 S.C. 439, 441, 385 S.E.2d 820, 820 (1989) (per
curiam).
71. See, e.g., Thomas v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 204 S.C. 247, 253, 29 S.E.2d
196, 198 (1944).
72. Carter alleged that the driver could have seen that the cotter pin was broken if
he had checked the bearing oil level in the wheel hub, a procedure recommended by the
owner's manual as part of the routine pre-trip inspection. Carter, 294 S.C. at 447-48, 365
S.E.2d at 331 (court of appeals' opinion).
[Vol. 42
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detected immediately after the work was completed, the owner may
not be required to continue to inspect the work periodically. For exam-
ple, in Carter, assuming that the defect could have been discovered
only when the cotter pin broke and that the owner was not required to
inspect the invoices, the defect would not have become apparent until
some time during the following four months.
. Also relevant is whether the owner has the mechanical knowledge
necessary to detect the defect. This may result in some questionable
verdicts, as the Carter case demonstrates. In Carter the jury assessed
punitive damages of $40,000 against the mechanic and $160,000 against
Jordan. The unfairness of the verdict in light of the mechanic's active
negligence and Jordan's passive negligence may have motivated the
court of appeals to devise the three-part test. The Carter decision,
however, is consistent with previous South Carolina cases73 and the
general view is that members of a jury, as representatives of the com-
munity, are uniquely qualified to recognize a breach of the proper stan-
dard of care.
Jennifer J. Aldrich
IV. OWNER OF STOLEN CAR NOT LIABLE FOR INJURY OR DAMAGE
ALTHOUGH HE LEFT THE KEYS IN THE CAR'S IGNITION
In Johnston v. Pittman7 4 the South Carolina Court of Appeals
held as a matter of law that even though a van driver negligently left
his keys in the ignition, this was not the proximate cause of an acci-
dent in which a thief stole the van and drove it negligently. The court
based its holding on Stone v. Bethea,7 5 a 1968 decision of the South
Carolina Supreme Court. In Stone the court ruled that the thief's neg-
ligent driving of a car superseded the car owner's negligence and the
owner could not be held liable for the thief's negligent driving.76 The
Johnston opinion reflects the difficulties present in deciding "key in
the ignition" cases. In a footnote, the court of appeals invited the su-
preme court to grant certiorari and take a second look at this issue in
South Carolina.
77
73. See, e.g., Wilson v. Marshall, 260 S.C. 271, 195 S.E.2d 610 (1973).
74. 298 S.C. 390, 380 S.E.2d 850 (Ct. App. 1989).
75. 251 S.C. 157, 161 S.E.2d 171 (1968).
76. Id. at 164, 161 S.E.2d at 174-75.
77. Johnston, 298 S.C. at 393 n.1, 380 S.E.2d at 852 n.1. "[W]e have no authority
to reconsider the decision of the Supreme Court in Stone .... Still, the Supreme Court
... may want to grant certiorari in this case and reconsider its decision in Stone ......
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On April 25, 1986, Elizabeth A. Johnston was injured severely
when her car collided with a van driven by Nathan Pittman, an es-
capee from the State Department of Youth Services. Pittman had sto-
len the van, which belonged to Made Rite Foods, Inc. (Made Rite).
Made Rite entrusted the van to Robert W. Chandler who managed
Made Rite's daily operations, which included the delivery of Made Rite
products to neighborhood convenience stores. James R. Godd, Chan-
dler's agent, was operating the van on the day Pittman stole it.78 Godd
parked the van in front of a Majik Market convenience store and left
the keys in the ignition while he made a delivery. Pittman stole the
van when Godd was inside the store. Shortly after the theft, Pittman
drove the van into Johnston's automobile.
7
0
Mrs. Johnston sued Godd, Chandler, and Made Rite for the negli-
gence of Godd, who was Chandler and Made Rite's agent. She alleged
that Godd was negligent when he failed to remove the keys from the
unattended van, failed to take proper precautions for securing the van,
and failed to maintain proper surveillance of the unattended van."'
The trial court held that Godd's actions, as a matter of law, were not
the proximate cause of Johnston's injuries and granted summary judg-
ment for the defendants. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's
decision and based its holding on the South Carolina Supreme Court's
ruling in Stone."'
In Stone the owner of a laundry business returned to his store at
8:30 p.m., parked his car in an alley, and left the keys in the ignition.
While the owner was in the shop, a thief stole the car and caused the
accident that injured Stone. Stone sued the owner of the car to recover
for the injuries he sustained in the accident. At the close of the testi-
mony, however, the trial court granted the car owner's motion for a
directed verdict.8 2 The supreme court affirmed the trial court and
stated that "to allow recovery would do violence to the rule of proxi-
mate cause. .. ,13
Johnston argued on appeal that Stone does not stand for the pro-
position that a car owner's liability in South Carolina has been decided
as a matter of law, but that the questions of owner negligence and
proximate cause must turn on the facts of each case.8 4 The court of
appeals disagreed, and relied on an observation made by Chief Judge
78. Id. at 391, 380 S.E.2d at 851.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 392, 380 S.E.2d at 851.
82. Stone v. Bethea, 251 S.C. 157, 160, 161 S.E.2d 171, 173 (1968).
83. Id.
84. Brief of Appellant at 7.
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Sanders in an earlier case, Accordini v. Security Central, Inc..85
In Accordini Judge Sanders interpreted the holding in Stone as
"although it might be foreseeable a car would be stolen if keys were
left in its ignition, it was not foreseeable a car would be driven negli-
gently after it was stolen."' 6 In a footnote, the Accordini court ob-
served, "The weight of American authority on 'keys in the car' cases
seems to be changing." The court then cited statistics which indicated
that the accident rate for stolen cars is approximately two hundred
times the normal accident rate.87 In Johnston the court of appeals
noted the Accordini footnote and the apparent change in tenor among
American courts, but stated that "we have no authority to reconsider
the decision of the Supreme Court in Stone . . . ."I The court sug-
gested, however, that "the Supreme Court, in light of the authority
cited by Judge Sanders in his [Accordini] footnote, may want to grant
certiorari in this case and reconsider its decision in Stone . . .,,"
Parties have litigated extensively the issue of owner liability in
"key in the ignition" cases throughout the United States.90 Most courts
have refused to impose liability on the owner of the vehicle.91 Courts
have held that (1) the negligence of the owner was not the proximate
cause of the plaintiff's injury because the thief's negligence broke the
chain of causation between the owner's negligence and the injury; 2 (2)
the owner had no common law duty to the injured plaintiff;9 3 and (3)
while it may be foreseeable that a car with the key in the ignition
85. Johnston, 298 S.C. at 392, 380 S.E.2d at 851-52 (quoting Accordini v. Security
Cent., Inc., 283 S.C. 16, 20, 320 S.E.2d 713, 715 (Ct. App. 1984)).
86. Accordini, 283 S.C. at 20, 320 S.E.2d at 715. In Accordini the plaintiffs' burglar
alarm malfunctioned and a thief stole certain property. The plaintiffs sued the security
company for negligence. Unlike a "key in the ignition" case, the court found that it was
foreseeable that property would be stolen if an alarm failed. The Accordini court held
that the defendant's reliance on Stone was misplaced. Id. at 18-20, 320 S.E.2d at 714-15.
87. Id. at 20 n.2, 320 S.E.2d at 715 n.2 (citing Peck, An Exercise Based Upon Em-
pirical Data: Liability for Harm Caused by Stolen Automobiles, 1969 Wis. L. REV. 909
(1969)).
88. Johnston, 298 S.C. at 393 n.1, 380 S.E.2d at 852 n.1.
89. Id.
90. See generally Annotation, Liability of Motorist Who Left Key in Ignition for
Damage or Injury Caused by Stranger Operating the Vehicle, 45 A.L.R.3D 787
(1972)(comprehensive review of case law on owner liability in "key in the ignition"
cases).
91. See generally W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEE-
TON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 313-14 (6th ed. 1984 & Supp. 1988) (the majority of courts
have refused on a variety of grounds to hold the owner liable).
92. See, e.g., Surratt v. Petrol, Inc., 160 Ind. App. 479, 312 N.E.2d 487 (1974);
Kalberg v. Anderson Bros. Motor Co., 251 Minn. 458, 88 N.W.2d 197 (1958); Joyce v. M
& M Gas Co., 672 P.2d 1172 (Okla. 1983).
93. See, e.g., Richards v. Stanley, 43 Cal. 2d 60, 271 P.2d 23 (1954).
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would be stolen, the owner could not foresee the plaintiffs injury.9
The current trend among courts is to review the facts of each case for
"special circumstances" that would make it reasonable to impose lia-
bility on the owner who, by simply removing the keys from the car,
could have prevented serious harm to innocent third parties.95 Courts
are willing generally to allow the jury to decide issues of duty, foresee-
ability, and proximate cause.96
In some states the owner's liability may be determined by a stat-
ute that requires owners to remove the ignition key from an unat-
tended motor vehicle. Only one jurisdiction with this type of statute,
however, has held that leaving the keys in the car is negligence per se
so that an owner's liability is absolute.9 7 Other jurisdictions that have
enacted these statutes have held that a violation of the statute is evi-
dence of negligence.9 ' Section 56-5-2570 of the South Carolina Code
provides that "[n]o person driving or in charge of a motor vehicle shall
permit it to stand unattended without first stopping the engine, lock-
ing the ignition, removing the key and effectively setting the brake
.... 09 Thus, the plaintiff in Stone charged that the defendant had
violated the South Carolina statute. The supreme court, however,
found that the violation of the statute, as a matter of law, was only a
remote cause of the injury. The court consequently did not hold the
defendant liable.100 In cases such as Stone and Johnston, in which a
state statute has been violated, the plaintiff must show that he is in
the class of persons that the legislature enacted the statute to pro-
tect.101 As a practical matter, this is difficult: although the statutes may
have been enacted to prevent car thefts, they were not intended to pro-
tect persons injured by the negligence of thieves.
10 2
Because the South Carolina Court of Appeals held that the de-
fendants in Johnston were not negligent as a matter df law, the court
refused to follow the example of most courts across the country. They
did so not because they believed that the trial court's grant of sum-
94. Id. But see Davis v. Thornton, 384 Mich. 138, 180 N.W.2d 11 (1970)
95. See, e.g., Hergenrether v. East, 61 Cal. 2d 440, 393 P.2d 164, 39 Cal. Rptr. 4
(1969); Illinois Farmers Ins. Co. v. Tapemark Co., 273 N.W.2d 630 (Minn. 1978).
96. See, e.g., Hendeles v. Sanford Auto Aution, Inc., 364 So. 2d 467 (Fla. 1978);
Gates v. Owen Chevrolet Co., 294 So. 2d 179 (Miss. 1974); Hill v. Yaskin, 75 N.J. 139,
380 A.2d 1107 (1977); Zinck v. Whelan, 120 N.J. Super. 432, 294 A.2d 727 (App. Div.
1972); Lichter v. Fritsch, 77 Wis. 2d 178, 252 N.W.2d 360 (1977).
97. Ross v. Hartman, 139 F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 790
(1944).
98. See, e.g., Ney v. Yellow Cab Co., 2 IMI. 2d 74, 117 N.E.2d 74 (1954).
99. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-2570 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
100. Stone v. Bethea, 251 S.C. 157, 161, 161 S.E.2d 171, 173 (1968).
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mary judgment yielded a correct result but because they were bound
by the precedent of Stone.103 The court of appeals' decision in John-
ston reasoned that the unforeseeable, intervening acts of the thief cut
off the owner's liability, but the Johnston court noted that Mrs. John-
ston had failed to introduce any "empirical data regarding the accident
rate for thieves.110 4 Perhaps the court's partial agreement with Ac-
cordini would have yielded a different result despite Stone if Mrs.
Johnston had presented more statistical evidence to support her claim
of foreseeability. Issues of foreseeability, proximate cause, and the in-
tervening negligence of subsequent tortfeasors are issues appropriately
decided on the facts of each case. In holding as a matter of law that an
owner is not liable, the South Carolina courts reject the nationwide
trend to look closely at the special circumstances of each "key in the
ignition" case.
Anne Frances Bleecker
V. NEW TORT LIABILITY FOR RESIDENTIAL LANDLORDS IN SOUTH
CAROLINA
In Watson v. Sellers05 the South Carolina Court of Appeals held
that a tenant can sue in tort for personal injuries proximately caused
by a landlord's breach of a duty that arises out of the South Carolina
Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (RLTA).10 6 Though Watson rep-
resents a significant departure from prior South Carolina court deci-
sions, it follows modern judicial thought and the needs of modern
society.107
103. Johnston, 298 S.C. at 393 n.1, 380 S.E.2d at 852 n.1.
104. Id.
105. 299 S.C. 426, 385 S.E.2d 369 (Ct. App. 1989).
106. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 27-40-10 to -940 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989). The RLTA is
modeled after the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, 7B U.L.A. 427-508
(1972), but some differences exist. The RLTA "governs most residential rental agree-
ments entered into or renewed on or after July 8, 1986." Wilcox, A Lawyer's Guide to
the South Carolina Landlord and Tenant Act, 39 S.C.L. REv. 493, 495 (1988). The
RLTA places the duties on a residential landlord to (1) comply with applicable building
and housing codes that materially affect health and safety, (2) repair and do whatever
reasonably is necessary to put and keep the premises in a fit and habitable condition, (3)
keep common areas reasonably safe, (4) keep common areas reasonably clean if the
premises contain more than four dwelling units, (5) make running water, hot water, and
heat available, and (6) maintain facilities and appliances in reasonably good and safe
working order. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-40-440 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989). The RLTA
applies only to residential dwelling units. Id. § 27-40-110. A dwelling unit is a structure
"used as a home, residence, or sleeping place." Id. § 27-40-210(3).
107. See Berger, The New Residential Tenancy Law-Are Landlords Public Utili-
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Betty Watson rented a mobile home from Barbara Sellers. Watson
sued Sellers when she sustained serious physical injuries because the
wooden stairs to the front door of her trailer collapsed under her.108 At
trial, the judge instructed the jury on two alternative theories. The first
instruction was that a tenant may recover in tort for a violation of a
duty imposed on the landlord by the RLTA.10 Alternatively, the trial
judge instructed the jury that a landlord who negligently undertakes to
make repairs may be liable for the injuries that are caused by the neg-
ligent repairs.110 The jury returned a general verdict for Watson, and
Sellers appealed to the South Carolina Court of Appeals for relief.'1 '
The South Carolina Court of Appeals relied on its recent decision
in Rayfield v. South Carolina Department of Corrections"' to deter-
mine whether the RLTA creates a cause of action for the breach of a
landlord's duty. According to Rayfield, a violation of a statute is negli-
gence per sell' if the plaintiff shows that the statute's purpose is to
prevent the type of harm that the plaintiff has suffered, and that the
plaintiff is a member of the particular class of persons that the statute
is designed to protect.' The court relied on Rayfield and reviewed the
RLTA's preamble, which states that the Act is "to provide for landlord
obligations, liability and remedies." 10 Section 27-40-20 of the RLTA
provides that its purpose also is to "modernize" and "revise" South
ties?, 60 NEB. L. REv. 707, 708-15 (1981). "It can be fairly said that a revolution of rather
major proportions has occurred." Id. at 715.
108. Watson, 299 S.C. at 427, 385 S.E.2d at 370.
109. Id. at 437, 385 S.E.2d at 375.
110. Id. at 427, 385 S.E.2d at 370.
111. Id.
112. 297 S.C. 95, 374 S.E.2d 910 (Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied, 298 S.C. 204, 399
S.E,2d 133 (1989). For an analysis of the Rayfield decision, see Case Comment, Court
Defines Test for Imposing Tort Liability on Public Ofimcials for Alleged Breach of Stat-
utory Duty, 41 S.C.L. REv. 211 (1989).
113. The term negligence per se indicates that a plaintiff does not need to prove the
duty owed by the defendant. Rather, the plaintiff only needs to show the existence of a
statute and that the defendant's conduct violated that statute. See Rayfield, 297 S.C. at
103-04, 374 S.E.2d at 914-15. In some jurisdictions the violation of a housing code is
relevant evidence of negligence. See Note, Judicial Expansion of Tenants' Private Law
Rights: Implied Warranties of Habitability and Safety in Residential Urban Leases, 56
CORNELL L. REV. 489, 499-500 (1971) (citing relevant cases). In other jurisdictions viola-
tion of a housing code is irrelevant in determining whether a landlord is negligent. Id.
114. Rayfield, 297 S.C. at 103, 374 S.E.2d at 914-15. Federal courts follow a similar
approach. Under Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), a private remedy is implicit in a statute
if the plaintiff is within the class of persons for whose benefit the legislature passed the
statute, if some implicit or explicit indication of legislative intent is present, and if the
implication of a remedy is consistent with the underlying legislative scheme. Watson, 299
S.C. at 434, 385 S.E.2d at 373 (quoting Cort, 422 U.S. at 78).
115. 1986 S.C. Acts 336.
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Carolina landlord-tenant law."i6 Further, section 27-40-50 states that
"remedies . . . must be so administered that an aggrieved party may
recover appropriate damages."' 11 Finally, section 27-40-610 provides
that "[a] tenant may recover actual damages . . . for any noncompli-
ance by the landlord with. . . section 27-40-440."18 Given these statu-
tory provisions, the court concluded that the legislature intended "to
create a cause of action in favor of the tenant and against the landlord
for failure, after notice, to keep in good repair.' -15
The Watson court also had an alternative basis for its holding. In
Conner v. Farmers and Merchants Bank"20 the South Carolina Su-
preme Court adopted the rule that a landlord who undertakes to make
repairs and does so negligently is liable for the injuries that are proxi-
mately caused by the negligent repairs.'2 ' The Watson court held that
even if the RLTA did not create a private cause of action, the jury's
verdict could be upheld under the Conner rule.' 2 Thus, the court
found against Sellers on b6th grounds.
Though the Watson decision represents a dramatic change from
pre-RLTA landlord-tenant law, it is a well-reasoned application of the
express language of the RLTA and the Rayfield decision. Because the
Watson court recognized a tort action only when the landlord has no-
tice of an unsafe condition, 23 however, the courts presumably will ap-
ply common-law rules when the landlord does not have notice of the
unsafe condition.
Before the RLTA, "[1]andlords generally . . . enjoyed broad pro-
tection under South Carolina law for personal injuries suffered by a
tenant on the leased premises. ' 1 21 Under the traditional rule the land-
lord owes no duty to keep the premises safe for the tenant."
25
Although under the general common-law rule a landlord owed no
116. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-40-20 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
117. Id. § 27-40-50(a).
118. Id. § 27-40-610(b).
119. Watson, 299 S.C. at 436, 385 S.E.2d at 374.
120. 243 S.C. 132, 132 S.E.2d 385 (1963).
121. Id. at 139-40, 132 S.E.2d at 388-89.
122. 299 S.C. at 438, 385 S.E.2d at 375.
123. Id. at 436, 385 S.E.2d at 374.
124. Wilcox, supra note 106, at 529. See also Hubbard & Felix, Liabilities of Sellers
and Lessors of Residential Realty in South Carolina, 40 S.C.L. REV. 545, 572 (1989).
125. Timmons v. Williams Wood Prods. Corp., 164 S.C. 361, 365, 162 S.E. 329, 331
(1932). See also Young v. Morrisey, 285 S.C. 236, 239, 329 S.E.2d 426, 428 (1985); Hub-
bard & Felix, supra note 124, at 572; Wilcox, supra note 106, at 529; Note, Personal
Injuries to the Tenant: The Landlord's Liability Therefor, 10 S.C.L. REV. 307 (1958); W.
KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §
63, at 434-35 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON] (general discussion of the
rule that the landlord owes no duty).
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duty to protect the tenant from personal injuries, the courts began to
develop exceptions that, in many jurisdictions, began to swallow the
general rule.1
26
The Watson court recognized a notable exception to the common-
law rule that a landlord who undertakes to make repairs must do so
with due care.127 This exception is based on the principle that one who
undertakes to perform an act must do so with due care.12 8 South Caro-
lina courts distinguish between nonfeasance and misfeasance when
they consider this exception. If a landlord agrees to make repairs and
fails to do so, his only liability is based on contract theories.2 " If the
landlord's negligent repairs proximately cause a tenant's injuries, how-
ever, the tenant can maintain an action in tort.1
3 0
The policies of the RLTA reflect the significant attributes of mod-
ern residential landlord-tenant relationships. First, the residential ten-
ant lacks significant bargaining power as he encounters form contracts
that frequently are on a "take it or'leave it" basis.'2 ' Second, the resi-
dential tenant lacks expertise when he deals with experienced land-
lords and "is often not capable of discovering defects in complex wir-
ing, heating and electrical systems."' 13' Third, the residential tenant
126. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 125, § 63, at 435.
127. 299 S.C. at 437-38, 385 S.E.2d at 375. See also Conner v. Farmers and
Merchants Bank, 243 S.C. 132, 139-40, 132 S.E.2d 385, 388-89 (1963); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 17.7 (1977); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 362 (1965);
Hubbard & Felix, supra note 124, at 577-78; Wilcox, supra note 106, at 529 n.139; Note,
supra note 125, at 314-15. The majority of jurisdictions recognize this exception to the
common-law rule. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 125, § 63, at 445.
128. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 125, § 63, at 445; Hubbard & Felix, supra
note 124, at 577.
129. Young v. Morrissey, 285 S.C. 236, 239-40, 329 S.E.2d 426, 428 (1985). See also
Timmons v. Williams Wood Prods. Corp., 164 S.C. 361, 371-72, 162 S.E. 329, 332-33
(1932) (landlord agreed to fix door hinges but did not undertake to fix them); Hubbard &
Felix, supra note 124, at 577; Wilcox, supra note 106, at 529. A tenant can recover for
personal injuries sustained as a result of a breach of contract only when "such conse-
quential losses were foreseeable because they were within the contemplation of the par-
ties," Hubbard & Felix, supra note 124, at 578.
130. See supra note 127 and accompanying text. Other exceptions to the common-
law rule require the landlord to (1) use due care to maintain the common areas of the
premises, (2) ensure that the premises are reasonably safe at the time he transfers con-
trol, if the landlord knows that the tenant will hold the premises open to the public, (3)
use due care to warn the tenant if the landlord knows or should know of a dangerous
condition, and (4) use due care to warn outsiders or to correct the condition when condi-
tions on the premises pose a foreseeable danger to those outside of the premises. Hub-
bard & Felix, supra note 124, at 574-77. See also PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 125, §
63.
131. Backman, The Tenant As a Consumer? A Comparison of Developments in
Consumer Law and in Landlord/Tenant Law, 33 OKLA. L. REv. 1, 3 (1980).
132. Dutenhaver, Nonwaiver of the Implied Warranty of Habitability in Residen-
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usually is unable to repair unsafe conditions himself.1 s3 Finally, and
most importantly, the residential tenant enters into the property trans-
action to meet his personal needs, but the landlord is primarily inter-
ested in investment profits.13 4 Accordingly, the landlord should bear
the burden of personal injuries for unsafe premises as a cost of doing
business. Thus, the Watson decision is sound for these policy reasons.
Watson, however, leaves three questions unanswered: (1) to what
leases does the decision apply; (2) of what significance is the notice
requirement in Watson; and (3) can a tenant waive the protection that
Watson affords.
First, the Watson court viewed the RLTA as an abrogation of the
common law and followed the maxim that statutes which abridge the
common law must be strictly construed.1 3 5 Hence, the Watson decision
should apply only to residential leases rather than to commercial
leases.
Second, the Watson court held that a landlord must have notice of
an unsafe condition before he is liable in tort for breach of a duty
under the RLTA. 36 Because the RLTA does not grant expressly a
cause of action to recover for personal injuries, it does not require that
the landlord be notified of the unsafe condition. A notice requirement,
however, is consistent with other provisions of the RLTA that clearly
condition tenant remedies upon notice to the landlord.1 3 Conse-
quently, it is logical to conclude that an act that conditioned other
remedies on notice to the landlord would also condition an implied
remedy on notice.
A notice requirement also will reach equitable results. For exam-
ple, the purchaser of a rental unit will not be liable for injuries that are
caused by conditions that he has had no opportunity to cure. Further-
tial Leases, 10 Loy. U. Cm. L.J. 41, 51 (1978). Even if the tenant has the capability to
discover unsafe conditions, because of his lack of bargaining power, he usually is unable
to obtain either a repair or a lower rental rate. See id.
133. See id. at 46.
134. Backman, supra note 131, at 4.
135. 299 S.C. at 433, 385 S.E.2d at 373.
136. Id. at 438, 385 S.E.2d at 375.
137. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-40-610(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989) (tenant can
terminate the rental agreement for the landlord's material noncompliance with the
RLTA that affects health and safety after the tenant gives the landlord notice of the
noncompliance and fourteen days to cure the noncompliance). Moreover, under section
27-40-630, the RLTA gives the tenant certain remedies if the landlord does not provide
essential services, but the tenant must deliver a written notice to the landlord. These
provisions indicate that tenant remedies under the RLTA are conditioned upon the ten-
ant giving the landlord an opportunity to cure his noncompliance. Id. § 27-40-630(a)
(tenant remedies in case the landlord does not provide essential services are dependent
on written notice to the landlord).
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more, if a holder of a mortgage forecloses on rental property, the courts
would not impose liability for personal injuries that are sustained as a
result of conditions that the mortgagee had no opportunity to cure.13
The notice requirement, however, will not unfairly shield landlords.
Under the RLTA, a landlord has notice if he (1) has actual knowledge
of the condition, (2) has received notification of the condition, or (3)
should have known of the condition from all of the facts and circum-
stances known to him at the time.139 Thus, if a landlord is aware of
facts that would lead a reasonable landlord to infer that the conditions
were unsafe, the landlord has notice of the unsafe conditions. Because.
of the other notice requirements in the RLTA and the equitable results
that a notice requirement will reach, the notice requirement of Watson
is a favorable rule.
Courts in other jurisdictions also have required that the landlord
have notice of an unsafe condition before tort liability will be im-
posed.140 For example, in Firth v. Marhoefer14 a Florida statute im-
posed a duty on landlords to keep common areas safe and reasonably
clean. The court held that in order to impose tort liability for a viola-
tion of the statute, "it is necessary to prove that the landlord had ac-
tual or constructive knowledge or notice of the existence of the danger-
ous condition for a time sufficient for it to be remedied. 14 2 Shroades v.
Rental Homes, Inc.",3 arose under a version of the Uniform Residential
Landlord and Tenant Act which is similar to the RLTA, and contained
a fact situation similar to Watson. The Ohio Supreme Court held that
in addition to showing that the landlord breached his statutory duty, a
plaintiff also must show "that the landlord received notice of the de-
fective condition of the rental premises, that the landlord knew of the
defect, or that the tenant has made reasonable, but unsuccessful at-
tempts to notify the landlord. '1 4' Thus, the South Carolina Court of
Appeals in Watson has joined other jurisdictions that recognize the' im-
portance of granting the landlord an opportunity to act reasonably
before the court imposes liability for an unreasonable act.
One final issue that arises from the Watson decison is whether a
landlord can contractually limit his liability by having the tenant waive
138. Under the RLTA, the definition of a landlord includes a mortgagee in posses-
sion. Id. § 27-40-210(8).
139. Id. § 27-40-240(a).
140. See, e.g., Shirkey v. Crain & Assocs. Management Co., 129 Ariz. 128, 629 P.2d
95 (Ct. App. 1981); Ward v. Watson, 524 A.2d 1108 (R.I. 1987); Tedder v. Raskin, 728
S.W.2d 343 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987).
141. 406 So. 2d 521 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
142. Id. at 522.
143. 68 Ohio St. 2d 20, 427 N.E.2d 774 (1981).
144. Id. at 25-26, 427 N.E.2d at 778.
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any right to sue for the landlord's failure to comply with the RLTA.
Under section 27-40-330(a)(1), a rental agreement cannot provide that
the tenant agrees to waive any rights and remedies under the RLTA.1 45
Furthermore, section 27-40-330(a)(3) of the RLTA states that a rental
agreement cannot contain a provision that "agrees to the exculpation
or limitation of any liability of the landlord arising under law or to
indemnify the landlord for that liability of the costs connected there-
with.' '146 This language does not refer to liability that arises under the
specific provisions of the RLTA, but refers to liability that arises under
"law." This apparently would include implied remedies that are cre-
ated by judicial decision. Therefore, a landlord should not be permit-
ted to limit his liability through an exculpatory clause in the lease.
Under the RLTA if a landlord deliberately uses a prohibited term
in the rental agreement, he is liable for the tenant's attorney's fees plus
an amount not to exceed the tenant's security deposit.147 Moreover, if
the landlord uses a prohibited term maliciously, the tenant can recover
up to three month's rent plus attorney's fees.148 Accordingly, the land-
lord should think twice before he attempts to avoid his duties and ex-
culpate himself through contract.
Watson v. Sellers is a sound decision that is consistent with Ray-
field, with the specific language of the RLTA, and with the basic poli-
cies that prompted the RLTA. Although these policies prompted
changes to South Carolina residential landlord-tenant law, the same
policies do not apply to commercial leases. Accordingly, basic common-
law principles should cover commercial leases. Moreover, the court's
requirement that the landlord have notice of the unsafe condition is an
equitable rule that is consistent with the RLTA. Finally, a landlord
should not be able to contract out of the protection that Watson now
gives to the South Carolina residential tenant. Although this change
may place a greater financial burden upon the landlord, he should bear
this burden as a cost to engage in the residential leasing business.
Mac D. Heavener, III
145. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-40-330(a)(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
146. Id. § 27-40-330(a)(3).
147. Id. § 27-40-330(b).
148. Id. The RLTA does not define malicious conduct. Section 27-40-330(b), how-
ever, indicates that the landlord must know that the term is prohibited.
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VI. MERCHANT HELD TO OWE A HIGHER DUTY OF CARE TO A
PHYSICALLY DISABLED INVITEE
In Lowrimore v. Fast Fare Stores, Inc.149 the South Carolina
Court of Appeals held that a merchant who knew of an invitee's physi-
cal disability owed that invitee a greater degree of care. Consequently,
the evidence offered at trial by the invitee that the store's floor was
slick and caused his fall was sufficient to present a question of fact for
the jury on the issue of the merchant's negligence."1°
Thomas W. Lowrimore, a one-leg amputee, was injured when he
slipped and fell in a Fast Fare Store. Lowrimore had been a daily cus-
tomer at the store. On the morning of the injury, Williams, a Fast Fare
employee who knew Lowrimore, was mopping the floor with a cleaner,
rather than the plain water he sometimes used. Williams had posted no
warning signs.' 5'
Before Lowrimore entered the store that morning, he watched
Williams mop the floor for several minutes. When Lowrimore entered
the store on his crutches, he slipped on the wet floor and fell.
Lowrimore testified that as he was falling he heard Williams tell him to
"watch out." Lowrimore had been in the store on previous occasions
while an employee mopped the floor, but according to his testimony,
the floor on those occasions had not been slick and he had never had
any problem walking on the wet floor. Lowrimore testified that when
he put his hand down to help himself up after he fell, he noticed that
the floor felt slick, like it was covered with wax.' 5' Lowrimore brought
a negligence action against Fast Fare for the personal injuries he sus-
tained as a result of the fall. The trial judge denied Fast Fare's motions
for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict and en-
tered judgment for Lowrimore. Fast Fare appealed and the court of
appeals affirmed.
The court of appeals reviewed the opinions in three South Caro-
lina slip-and-fall cases. The court restated the rule of Howard v. K-
Mart Discount Stores:'53 "proof that a floor was slick is insufficient to
establish negligence; in order to establish negligence, there must be ev-
idence or testimony that the floor was so slick as to constitute an un-
safe condition."' 54 The court also cited the court of appeals' opinion in
Young v. Meeting Street Piggly Wiggly.1 55 In Young the court held
149. 299 S.C. 418, 385 S.E.2d 218 (Ct. App. 1989).
150. Id. at 423, 385 S.E.2d 221.
151. Id. at 419-20, 385 S.E.2d at 219.
152. Id.
153. 293 S.C. 134, 359 S.E.2d 81 (Ct. App. 1987).
154. Lowrimore, 299 S.C. at 421, 385 S.E.2d at 220.
155. 288 S.C. 508, 343 S.E.2d 636 (Ct. App. 1986).
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that when customers are likely to track rainwater into a store during
rainy weather, the mere presence of such water does not automatically
make a merchant liable.156
The Lowrimore court next cited Felder v. K-Mart Corp.,57 a case
similar to Young, in which a plaintiff slipped on rainwater that some-
one tracked in from outside.158 Although similar to Young, the trial
court's verdict in Felder was upheld on appeal because the witnesses
gave conflicting testimony concerning what steps K-Mart took to alle-
viate the danger created by the presence of the water.15
The Lowrimore court, relying on Young and Felder as precedent,
established that to prove negligence a plaintiff must show more than
the slickness of the floor, or that the floor was wet. The plaintiff must
show that the defendant actually was negligent in failing to remove the
danger or to warn invitees of it.
The court then set out the duty that the merchant owed to
Lowrimore, as an invitee. The court quoted the South Carolina Su-
preme Court's holding in Graham v. Whitaker:60
A person owes an invitee the duty of exercising reasonable or ordinary
care for his safety and is liable for any injury resulting from the
breach of this duty. This degree of care must be commensurate with
the particular circumstances involved, including the age and capacity
of the invitee. This duty is an active or affirmative duty. It includes
refraining from any act which may make the invitee's use of the
premises dangerous or result in injury to him.161
Using the Graham standard, the court of appeals held that to deter-
mine the degree of care Fast Fare owed to Lowrimore, Williams's
knowledge of Lowrimore's infirmity had to be considered. The court
stated: "As a person Williams knew to be disabled physically,
Lowrimore was entitled to greater care than those more physically fit
than he.'6 2 The Lowrimore opinion marks the first time a court has
applied this standard in a case in which the plaintiff slipped and fell
while visiting a self-service store.
In Felder v. K-Mart Corp.16' the South Carolina Supreme Court
declined an opportunity to hold that a merchant owed an elderly invi-
156. Id. at 510-11, 343 S.E.2d at 637-38.
157. 297 S.C. 446, 377 S.E.2d 332 (1989).
158. Lowrimore, 299 S.C. at 422, 385 S.E.2d at 220.
159. 297 S.C. at 450, 377 S.E.2d at 334-35.
160. 282 S.C. 393, 321 S.E.2d 40 (1984).
161. Lowrimore, 299 S.C. at 422, 385- S.E.2d at 220 (quoting Graham, 282 S.C. at
398, 321 S.E.2d at 43) (emphasis in original).
162. Id. at 423, 385 S.E.2d at 221.
163. 297 S.C. 446, 448, 377 S.E.2d 332, 333 (1989).
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tee a greater degree of care. In Felder the court noted that the plaintiff
invitee was eighty-one years old,16 ' but did not consider whether the
invitee's age affected the duty of care the merchant owed to him.
The court of appeals held that Lowrimore set forth sufficient evi-
dence to present a question of fact for the jury on the issue of Fast
Fare's negligence. Lowrimore's testimony that he fell on the wet, slick
floor would have been insufficient to present a question of fact under
the holdings of both Howard and Young. In Lowrimore, however, the
court focused on the relationship between the plaintiff and the
merchant, and held that sufficient evidence of negligence existed.
First, the court reasoned that Fast Fare owed Lowrimore a greater
degree of care, because Williams, Fast Fare's employee, knew of
Lowrimore's disability. 165 The court also refused to charge Lowrimore
with knowledge of the dangers of an obviously wet floor. The court
held that even if Lowrimore could see that the floor was wet, the jury
could reasonably have found that to Lowrimore it constituted a "hid-
den condition and danger of which Williams had knowledge and of
which Lowrimore had less or no knowledge. . ". ."I ' The court implied
that Lowrimore should not be charged with knowledge of the danger of
the obviously wet floor because when Lowrimore previously had been
in the store, the floors had been wet, but not slick.
The Lowrimore opinion departs from the usual rule that invitees
normally are required to exert care for their own safety around an ob-
viously wet floor. For example, in reasoning that a court could not base
a merchant's liability solely on the presence of a wet floor, the Young
court cited an Ohio Supreme Court opinion which stated that "'every
one [sic] knows that a damp floor is likely to be a little more slippery
that a dry floor . . . ,,"16 The Young court then held that the
merchant had made reasonable efforts by frequently mopping the floor,
posting Warning signs, and putting down mats, because an "ordinary
reasonable person" would expect the floor to be wet under the rainy
circumstances presented by the case.16 8 The court of appeals, however,
did not charge Lowrimore with knowledge of the dangerous condition
of the wet floor, presumably because of his past experiences in the Fast
Fare store. The court held that because it did not charge Lowrimore
with such knowledge, and because Fast Fare owed Lowrimore a greater
duty of care, the jury reasonably could find that evidence of a slick
164. Id. at 447, 377 S.E.2d at 333.
165. Lowrimore, 299 S.C. at 423, 385 S.E.2d at 221.
166. Id.
167. Young v. Meeting St. Piggly Wiggly, 288 S.C. 508, 511, 343 S.E.2d 636, 638 (Ct.
App. 1986) (quoting S.S. Kresge Co. v. Fader, 116 Ohio St. 718, 728, 158 N.E. 174, 175
(1927)).
168. Id. at 512, 343 S.E.2d at 638.
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floor was sufficient to establish Williams's negligence in failing to warn
Lowrimore of a hidden danger."6 9
Because the South Carolina Supreme Court has not held that a
self-service merchant owes an aged or physically disabled invitee a
greater duty of care, and because the court of appeals stressed the par-
ticular relationship between the merchant and the invitee, Lowrimore
should not be read too broadly. Although the court does not make it
clear, an obviously disabled invitee, not known by the merchant, might
not be given the same high standard' of care as the invitee in
Lowrimore.
Denise Campbell Yarborough
VII. FORESEEABLE RESPONSE WILL 'NOT BREAK CHAIN OF PROXIMATE
CAUSATION
In Wallace v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.17 0 the South Carolina Court of
Appeals held that a product defect that creates a hazardous condition
may be the proximate cause of injuries sustained even though the
party is attempting to rectify the hazardous condition. The court also
held that an attempt to remove the hazardous condition is not a volun-
tary assumption of risk.
In Wallace a soft drink bottle exploded while the plaintiff was
holding it. Fragments of glass and liquid fell to the kitchen floor, but
the explosion did not injure the plaintiff. Five minutes later, as the
plaintiff picked up fragments of the broken glass by hand, he slipped
on the liquid and seriously injured himself. Wallace sued the bottle
manufacturer, the soft drink distributor, and the retailer on theories of
negligence, strict tort liability, and breach of an implied warranty of
merchantability.17 1 The trial court granted summary judgment to all of
the defendants because of lack of proximate cause, contributory negli-
gence, and assumption of risk. The court of appeals reversed on all
three grounds, and remanded the case for trial on the issues of contrib-
utory negligence and assumption of risk.
172
The defendants argued that the plaintiff's attempt to clean up the
bottle in an allegedly negligent manner 17 was a superseding cause and,
169. Lowrimore, 299 S.C. at 423, 385 S.E.2d at 222.
170. - S.C. -, 389 S.E.2d 155 (Ct. App. 1989).
171. Id. at -, 389 S.E.2d at 156.
172. Id. at -, 389 S.E.2d at 156-59.
173. The plaintiff admitted that he walked across the floor in smooth leather-soled
bedroom slippers, but maintained that he used his best efforts to avoid stepping in the
liquid. Id. at ., 389 S.E.2d at 156.
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therefore, the bottle's explosion was not the proximate cause of his in-
juries. In rejecting this argument, the court cited two requirements to
use to determine if an intervening cause supersedes the original act.
The court stated: "If the intervening acts are (1) set in motion by the
original wrongful act and (2) are the normal and foreseeable results of
the original act, the final result, as well as every intermediate cause, is
considered in law to be the proximate result- of the first wrongful
cause."
1 7 4
Pfaehler v. Ten Cent Taxi Co. 17 established the requirement that
the intervening act must be set in motion by the original act.77 In
Pfaehler a taxi cab driver left an intoxicated passenger alone in the
front seat of the cab with the keys in the ignition. The passenger drove
the cab away and collided with another automobile, damaged the other
automobile, and injured its occupants. The trial court held the cab
company liable for damages. On appeal the South Carolina Supreme
Court ruled that the original wrongdoer is liable if he set the interven-
ing cause in motion, or if the negligent act operated through the inter-
vening cause to produce the injurious result.177 In Pfaehler the court
noted that the cab driver's wrongful act was not just leaving the keys
in the ignition, but in creating an opportunity for the intoxicated pas-
senger to steal the car. The car driver's original act of negligence,
therefore, set in motion the passenger's intervening act. 7 8 Stone v. Be-
thea 79 however, is distinguishable from Pfaeler. In Stone the defend-
ant left his keys in his car and a thief stole the car. The thief negli-
gently caused an accident which injured a third party. The South
Carolina Supreme Court held that the intervening acts of the thief
were independent from the defendant's original negligence. The Stone
court focused on the lack of foreseeability of the theft because the
owner parked the car in a well-lighted area directly across from the
police station. 80
In Driggers v. City of Florence'8' the plaintiff sued for injuries af-
ter she walked through some tall grass to get around a walkway and
stepped into an open water meter. The city had no constructive knowl-
edge of the open meter and, therefore, its only negligence was the fail-
174. Id. at -, 389 S.E.2d at 157.
175. 198 S.C. 476, 18 S.E.2d 331 (1942).
176. Id. at 485-86, 18 S.E.2d at 335.
177. Id. at 485, 18 S.E.2d at 335.
178. Id., 18 S.E.2d at 335-36 (court discusses rule on intervening acts).
179. 251 S.C. 157, 161 S.E.2d 171 (1968).
180. See id. at 161-62, 161 S.E.2d at 173. The court stated: "One is not charged with
foreseeing that which is unpredictable or that which could not be expected to happen."
Id.
181. 190 S.C. 309, 2 S.E.2d 790 (1939).
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ure to provide a paved walkway and the failure to keep the grass cut.
The South Carolina Supreme Court reasoned that the open water
meter was an entirely independent and intervening cause of the injury
which superseded the city's negligence."s2 In light of the court's reason-
ing in these cases the plaintiff's action to clean up the broken bottle in
Wallace does not appear to be independent from the original wrong.
The bottle's defect set in motion the plaintiff's response."'3
The foreseeability of an intervening action was at issue in Young
v. Tide Craft, Inc. 8 4 In Tide Craft, Inc. a mechanic attempted to re-
pair a boat's defective steering system by installing spliced cables. The
boat's owner subsequently drowned when the steering failed and he
was thrown into the water. His widow sued the boat's manufacturer,
the retailer, and the repair shop for her husband's wrongful death and
conscious pain and suffering. The trial court entered judgment against
the manufacturer and absolved the retailer and repair shop of liabil-
ity. 85 The manufacturer appealed and the South Carolina Supreme
Court held that neither the manufacturer nor the retailer could have
foreseen the repair shop's intervening acts.188 The standard of foresee-
ability must be determined by looking at the natural and probable con-
sequences of the complained of act. Splicing was recognized as an un-
safe practice in the trade and the plaintiff produced no evidence that
the accident would have occurred had the repairman not spliced the
cable.1
87
In Wallace the court of appeals emphasized the foreseeability of
the plaintiff's intervening act rather than the quality of the act and
refused to* consider the possibility of a lack of due care by the plain-
tiff. 1 The court noted that a plaintiff's failure to use due care goes to
the issue of contributory negligence and not to proximate cause. '
While "contributory negligence is an affirmative defense to an action
182. Id. at 311-13, 2 S.E.2d at 791-92.
183. See Wallace, - S.C. at , 389 S.E.2d at 155.
184. 270 S.C. 453, 242 S.E.2d 671 (1978).
185. Id. at 453-61, 242 S.E.2d at 671-75.
186. See id. at 463-64, 242 S.E.2d at 676-77.
187. Id. at 464-66, 242 S.E.2d at 676-77. In Tide Craft, Inc. the court noted that the
mechanic's actions were extraordinary. Id. at 465, 242 S.E.2d at 677. This language has
caused one commentator to infer that South Carolina courts view an accident retrospec-
tively and find no proximate cause if the intervening cause appears extraordinary.
Fischer, Products Liability-Proximate Cause, Intervening Cause, and Duty, 52 Mo. L.
REv. 547, 564 (1987). The same commentator notes, however, that there may be little
practical significance whether a court views the intervention prospectively or retrospec-
tively. Id.
188. - S.C. at -, 389 S.E.2d at 157 (citing Matthews v. Porter, 239 S.C. 620, 124
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for negligence. . . .It has no application to an action based on breach
of warranty or liability for a defective product." 190 The quality of the
intervening act itself, however, is not completely irrelevant. The court
of appeals' second requirement is that the intervening act is normal
and foreseeable.10 1 Thus, intentional or reckless acts by a plaintiff may
be considered superseding causes and, therefore, bar recovery.
The court's holding in Wallace ultimately may be limited to cases
in which the original risk created by the defective product is the same
as that risk subsequently encountered by the plaintiff in his remedial
acts. In Wallace the defect's original risk included the possibility of a
slip and fall after the explosion. The court of appeals recognized the
foreseeability of slip and fall injuries in exploding bottle cases and then
discussed how the plaintiff's intervening acts in Wallace did not super-
sede the original wrong.19 2 If the injury to the plaintiff had been unique
to his remedial acts, the court may not have found that the defect was
the proximate cause of his injury.
193
The Wallace opinion leaves open the question whether proximate
cause extends to all remedial actions or to only remedial actions that
are in response to a continuing threat. The Eighth Circuit in Leistra v.
Bucyrus-Erie Co.'9 4 said that the proper test of superseding cause is to
look at whether "the forces set in operation by the defendant have
come to rest in a position of apparent safety, and some new force inter-
venes."19 5 The Wallace court found that the liquid and broken glass
continued to threaten the safety of the plaintiff and his wife after the
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at -, 389 S.E.2d at 156-57.
193. See Leistra v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 443 F.2d 157 (8th Cir. 1971) (injury sustained
in trying to repair a crane was not within the foreseeable risk created by the defect in its
manufacture). An important factor in determining whether an intervening force is a su-
perseding cause is whether the "intervention brings about harm different in kind from
that which would otherwise have resulted from the actor's negligence." RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF TORTS § 442(a) (1965).
194. 443 F.2d 157 (8th Cir. 1971).
195. Id. at 162 (quoting W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 49, at 286
(3d ed. 1964)). The same language is found in W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEErON, & D.
OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 42, at 277-78 (5th ed. 1984) [herein-
after PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS]. Prosser mentions this test in a discussion on the
discredited distinction between active causes of harm and mere conditions upon which a
cause operates. Prosser states:
So far as [the distinction] has any validity at all, it must refer to the type of
case where the forces set in operation by the defendant have come to rest in a
position of apparent safety, and some new force intervenes. But even in such
cases, it is not the distinction between 'cause' and 'condition' which is impor-
tant, but the nature of the risk and the character of the intervening cause.
Id. at 278 (footnote omitted).
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explosion.196 It is unclear, therefore, whether a continuing hazardous
condition may be a third requirement in South Carolina for a plain-
tiff's remedial action to be merely a proximate result and not a super-
seding cause of the original wrong. Although the Wallace court took
note of the continuing hazardous condition in its discussion of proxi-
mate cause, the discussion supported the court's contention that the
plaintiff's response was both normal and foreseeable given the circum-
stances. It does not appear, therefore, that the court of appeals in-
tended to limit its holding in Wallace to remedial acts in response to a
hazardous condition.
Although the court acknowledged that assumption of risk can be a
defense, it held that the plaintiff in Wallace had not voluntarily as-
sumed the risk. The court concluded that a plaintiff cannot voluntarily
assume a risk if the defendant's conduct has left him no reasonable
alternative. 97 The court's position finds support in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts. Section 496E(2) of the Restatement states that
"[t]he plaintiff's acceptance of a risk is not voluntary if the defendant's
tortious conduct has left him no reasonable alternative course of con-
duct in order to (a) avert harm to himself or another . . . .,,g The
Wallace court observed that even though the plaintiff may have been
negligent when he attempted to pick up the large pieces of glass, he
had no choice but to clean up the spilled liquid. The plaintiff's action,
however, goes to the issue of contributory negligence and not assump-
tion of risk."99
Jennifer J. Aldrich
VIII. POTENTIAL FOR REPETITION MAY BE NECESSARY FOR REcOvERY
UNDER THE SOUTH CAROLINA UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICE ACT
In Dowd v. Imperial Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.200 the South Caro-
lina Court of Appeals held that an automobile dealer violated the
South Carolina Unfair Trade Practice Act20' (SCUTPA) when its sales-
man misrepresented the history of a car to a potential buyer.20' In find-
ing a SCUTPA violation, the court of appeals relied on its decision in
196. Wallace, - S.C. at -, 389 S.E.2d at 157.
197. Id. at -, 389 S.E.2d at 157-58.
198. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496E(2)(a) (1965).
199. See id. § 496E comment c, illustration 4 (1965).
200: 298 S.C. 439, 381 S.E.2d 212 (Ct. App. 1989).
201. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 39-5-10 to -560 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
202. 298 S.C. at 443, 381 S.E.2d at 214.
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Noack Enterprises, Inc. v. Country Corner Interiors, Inc.,03 which
held that a party may recover under the SCUTPA only for deceptive
acts or practices that affect the public interest.
204
In Dowd one of the plaintiffs205 (Mrs. Dowd) purchased an auto-
mobile from the defendant (Imperial) after a salesman told her that
the car had been part of a fleet lease. In fact, the dealer had rented the
car daily as a Dealer Rent-a-Car. Mrs. Dowd claimed that she would
not have bought the car if she had known it was a Dealer Rent-a-
Car.26 Almost immediately after the sale, the car began to have
problems. Within two years the car needed seven batteries, three alter-
nators, and two voltage regulators, none of which solved its electrical
problem. Mrs. Dowd-and her son sued Imperial for fraud and violation
of the SCUTPA. At trial the jury found for Imperial on the fraud cause
of action and against Imperial on the SCUTPA cause of action. The
court of appeals affirmed.
2 0 7
In Noack the court of appeals held that to be actionable under the
SCUTPA, deceptive acts or practices must affect the public interest
and these acts must have the "potential for repetition. '20 8 Since
Noack, the court of appeals has required that. before a plaintiff can
recover under the SCUTPA, the plaintiff must show the deceptive act's
public interest impact by showing its potential for repetition.209
The South Carolina Supreme Court, however, did not require
proof of a deceptive act's public interest impact in Inman v. Ken Hy-
att Chrysler Plymouth, Inc..210 In Inman an automobile dealer sold a
car as "a new demonstrator" with "all the bugs worked out.' 211 After
the sale, the buyer learned that the car had been owned previously and
sued the dealer for fraud and violation of the SCUTPA.212 The court
held that the dealer's misrepresentations were actionable under the
SCUTPA. The court stated that under the SCUTPA a plaintiff does
203. 290 S.C. 475, 351 S.E.2d 347 (Ct. App. 1986).
204. Id. at 479, 351 S.E.2d at 350.
205. James A. Schultz, Mrs. Dowd's son, was also a party to the action.
206. Dowd, 298 S.C. at 441, 381 S.E.2d at 213.
207. Id. Apparently the dealer honored its warranty. It is unclear whether plaintiff
actually suffered the monetary loss awarded by the jury ($1500), but the court of appeals
indicated that the evidence supported the jury's verdict. See id. at 442, 381 S.E.2d at
214.
208. Noack Enters., Inc. v. Country Corner Interiors, Inc., 290 S.C. 475, 480, 351
S.E.2d 347, 350-51 (Ct. App. 1986).
209. See, e.g., Key Co. v. Fameco Distrib., Inc., 292 S.C. 524, 526-27, 357 S.E.2d 476,
477-78 (Ct. App. 1987); Barnes v. Jones Chevrolet Co., 292 S.C. 607, 612-13, 358 S.E.2d
156, 159-160 (Ct. App. 1987).
210. 294 S.C. 240, 363 S.E.2d 691 (1988).
211. Id. at 241, 363 S.E.2d at 691-92.
212. Id., 363 S.E.2d at 692.
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not need to prove that a representation was made with an intent to
deceive, but only that the representation had the capacity to deceive.
213
By applying this liberal test, the South Carolina Supreme Court fol-
lowed the reasoning of cases decided prior to Noack.2" The Inman
opinion makes no reference to the public interest impact requirement
or to the act's potential for repetition. The supreme court noted, how-
ever, that the sale of "a repossessed product as new without disclosure,
even if the product is as good as new" had been held to be a deceptive
trade practice by the United States Supreme Court.21 5 The dealer's
misrepresentation alone was sufficient proof of a SCUTPA violation to
satisfy the Inman court.218
In Dowd the court of appeals addressed facts that closely paral-
leled those in Inman. Both cases involved misrepresentations of an au-
tomobile's history by a car salesman. One distinguishing factor, how-
ever, was that the salesman in Inman did not have a history of making
misrepresentations to potential buyers, 217 but in Dowd the court noted
that the dealer had a policy of misrepresenting its cars to potential
buyers. 218 Imperial trained its salesmen to tell potential buyers that a
car had been only a fleet lease even when they believed the car was a
Dealer Rent-a-Car. In the court's view this dealer policy established
the potential for repetition of the deceptive act. The court of appeals
discussed Inman's remarkably similar facts and cited its holding of a
SCUTPA violation in Dowd.21 9 The court also held that because of Im-
perial's policy of misrepresentation the potential existed for repetition
and, consequently, "the deceptive trade practice ha[d] the requisite
impact on the public interest."220 It is not clear in Dowd whether the
court of appeals would have found a SCUTPA violation if the salesman
had acted on his own initiative in misrepresenting the history of the
automobile.
The court of appeals' reliance on the Noack line of cases despite
213. Id. at 242, 363 S.E.2d at 692.
214. See Clarkson v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 761 F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1985) (exter-
minator's negligent inspection did not have sufficient capacity to deceive to be actionable
under SCUTPA since homeowner did not rely on the misrepresentation); State ex rel.
McLeod v. C & L Corp., 280 S.C. 519, 313 S.E.2d 334 (Ct. App. 1984) (principal liable
under SCUTPA for Teal estate agent's misrepresentations to potential buyers despite
principal's lack of knowledge about agent's wrongdoing).
215. Inman v. Ken Hyatt Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 294 S.C. 240, 242-43, 363 S.E.2d
691, 692 (1988) (citing Federal Track Comm'n v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374
(1965)).
216. See id.
217. See id. at 241, 363 S.E.2d at 692.
218. Dowd, 298 S.C. at 441 n.2, 381 S.E.2d at 213 n.2.




Maring et al.: Torts
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the supreme court's liberal language in Inman creates an apparent in-
consistency under the SCUTPA. Although the supreme court in Inman
did not reject the Noack requirement of a public interest impact, the
court chose not to require restrictive standards for proof of a SCUTPA
violation.221 The court of appeals, however, has retained its require-
ment of an impact on the public interest, which may be proven by
showing the act's potential for repetition. Additionally, the court of ap-
peals may have restricted further SCUTPA actions by requiring a
plaintiff to prove that a defendant makes a practice of deception to
satisfy the public interest impact requirement.
The Dowd decision may be read as an attempt by the court of
appeals to bring its strict public interest impact standard in line with
the broader standard used by the South Carolina Supreme Court in
Inman. Additionally, by emphasizing the unfair act's potential for rep-
etition in Dowd, the court appears to continue its more narrow inter-
pretation of the SCUTPA.
Ultimately, the pro-consumer interpretation of the SCUTPA by
South Carolina courts should broaden the application of the public in-
terest impact standard with its potential for repetition requirement.
Karl J. Forrest
IX. ABSENT A SPECIAL DUTY POLICE OFFICERS HAVE No COMMON
LAW DUTY TO CARE FOR INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF THE GENERAL PUBLIC
In Russell v. City of Columbia222 the South Carolina Court of Ap-
peals held that police officers have no common law duty "to care for,
protect, assist, and provide treatment to citizens who are incapacitated,
intoxicated, or seriously injured. '223 The court distinguished police of-
ficers' freedom from liability to the public in the practice of their pro-
fessional duties224 from their potential liability in performing for pri-
vate individuals special duties which may arise by statute225 or
circumstance.
226
221. Inman, 294 S.C. at 242, 363 S.E.2d at 692.
222. - S.C. .. , 390 S.E.2d 463 (Ct. App. 1989).
223. Id. at -, 390 S.E.2d at 465.
224. Officers' professional duties include keeping order in the community, taking ap-
propriate measures to prevent crime, bringing criminals to justice, and retaining evi-
dence for use in court. See id.
225. Special duties may be imposed on law enforcement officers by statute. See, e.g.,
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-5-30 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (statute expressly provides for a private
cause of action and thus imposes a private duty on law enforcement officers).
226. It is not certain what constitutes a "circumstance" sufficient to impose a special
duty in South Carolina. Patel v. McIntyre, 667 F. Supp. 1131, 1138 n.13 (D.S.C. 1987).
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Sebbieleen Russell, the administratrix of her son Gregory Wood's
estate, brought a wrongful death action against the City of Columbia
and two of its police officers after Wood's accidental death. On Sep-
tember 7, 1985, Wood and his roommate were asked to leave a Colum-
bia restaurant and bar because they were intoxicated. The pair argued
in the parking lot over who would drive home. A bartender from the
restaurant interceded and threw Wood to the ground. Wood received a
laceration to his head. Two Columbia city police officers arrived on the
scene, but the restaurant employees did not ask the policemen to ar-
rest Wood. The officers demanded that Wood leave the premises.
Shortly thereafter Wood fell from a nearby train trestle and
drowned.
227
Russell premised her negligence complaint against the City and
the two officers on three theories. 28 First, she alleged that the officers
had a common law duty to protect Wood, a member of the general
public who obviously was incapacitated, intoxicated, and injured. Next,
she alleged that the Columbia Police Department's manual mandated
that its officers follow specific ministerial procedures when dealing with
intoxicated individuals, and that the two officers who investigated the
incident were negligent because they had failed to follow the proce-
dures. Finally, she alleged that the officers had a duty not to interfere
with persons at the scene who were attempting to aid Wood.229
To prevail in her wrongful death action Russell had to prove the
three essential elements of negligence: (1) that the police officers owed
Wood a duty of care; (2) that they breached that duty; and (3) that
their breach of duty proximately caused Wood's death.2 30 Both the cir-
cuit court and the court of appeals denied Russell's claim primarily
because they held that the officers owed Wood no legal duty, which
eliminated Russell's cause of action.
2 31
The circuit court, relying on Patel v. McIntryre,23 2 granted the de-
fendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings. 33 In Patel a deputy
An example given in another jurisdiction is the promise of police protection to an in-
formant. See, e.g., Schuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534, 180
N.Y.S.2d 265 (1958).
227. Russell, - S.C. at -, 390 S.E.2d at 464; Record at 4.
228. Id. at - 390 S.E.2d at 465.
229. The court dismissed Russell's final allegation that the officers' negligent failure
to interfere proximately caused Wood's death because Russell failed to plead sufficient
facts to establish the cause of action. See id. at , 390 S.E.2d at 466-67.
230. See South Carolina Ins. Co. v. James C. Greene & Co., 290 S.C. 171, 176, 348
S.E.2d 617, 620 (Ct. App. 1986) (court lists elements of negligence and notes that with-
out a breach of duty there is no negligence).
231. Russell, - S.C. at _ 390 S.E.2d 465.
232. 667 F. Supp. 1131 (D.S.C. 1987).
233. Record at 23-26.
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sheriff came upon a motorist who had run off the road into a field. The
motorist claimed that he had missed a road sign. The deputy never
realized that the driver was intoxicated, so he helped the driver get
back on the road. Later that night the intoxicated driver was involved
in a head-on collision in which he and three others died and several
people were seriously injured. The Patel court held that the deputy,
who had failed to stop the drunk driver, was not liable for a breach of
duty and noted that the "duty to enforce the law is a public duty for
the breach or nonperformance of which [law enforcement officers] are
liable only to the public in the absence of a statute or circumstances
imposing a private duty."
234
Likewise in Russell the court of appeals held that the officers had
no common law duty to act.235 The crux of the court's opinion was that
"[a]n affirmative legal duty exists only if created by statute, contract,
relationship, status, property interest, or some other special circum-
stance." 36 Although the court refused to impose a common law duty
on police to aid intoxicated or seriously injured persons, 37 the court
did note that if the officers had undertaken to render aid to Wood,
they would have assumed a duty to exercise reasonable care, which
may have subjected them to liability.
238
Some jurisdictions recognize a legal duty to care for the intoxi-
cated or seriously injured. For example, the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court held in Irwin v. Town of Ware23 9 that two police officers
who failed to remove an intoxicated driver from a roadway were liable
in negligence to a person later injured by the drunk driver. The Irwin
court gave special attention to the officers' failure to act when they
could foresee that harm would follow from their inaction. The court
also concluded that an act is not discretionary simply because the act
requires an officer to make a judgment call in the exercise of his
duty.
24 0
As public officials, police officers are charged with "certain affirma-
tive duties not shared by private citizens. '24 1 Their official duties may
be classified as either ministerial or discretionary. Ministerial duties
are "absolute, certain, and imperative, involving merely execution of a
234. 667 F. Supp. at 1138 (footnote omitted).
235. - S.C. -, 390 S.E.2d at 465.
236. Id. (citing Rayfield v. South Carolina Dep't of Corrections, 297 S.C. 95, 100, 374
S.E.2d 910, 913 (Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied, 298 S.C. 204, 379 S.E.2d 133 (1989).
237. Id.
238. Id. at - n.6, 390 S.E.2d 465 n.6.
239. 392 Mass. 745, 467 N.E.2d 1292 (1984).
240. Id. at 752-54, 467 N.E.2d at 1298.
241. Russell, - S.C. at _ 390 S.E.2d at 465.
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specific duty arising from fixed and designated facts. '24 2 Discretionary
duties require personal deliberation and individual judgment. 3 In
South Carolina courts historically have held that public officials are
immune from liability in the exercise of their discretionary duties, but
not in performing ministerial duties.244 Even though the South Caro-
lina Supreme Court abolished sovereign immunity as a defense to pub-
lic liability,24 5 the distinction between discretionary and ministerial du-
ties for law enforcement officers' liability remains.246
Russell argued that the police officers' duty to Wood was ministe-
rial and not discretionary. 4 7 She based her allegation on language in a
police department Procedures and Policy Manual that gave instruc-
tions for dealing with intoxicated persons.248 Russell described the
manual "as analogous to a statute imposing a 'special duty' on a public
official. ' 249 The court, however, viewed the manual as a statement of
internal policies and procedures not necessarily intended to benefit
specific individuals.
250
Generally administrative policies and procedures do not impose li-
ability unless they create a special duty. If a policy "is promulgated for
the essential purpose of protecting identifiable individuals from a par-
ticular kind of harm, then it may create a 'special duty' which gives
rise to a cause of action in negligence by an individual who is damaged
as a result of a breach of the duty."'2 1 While recognizing the possibility
that the officers may have had a special duty to Wood, the court de-
clined to hold the officers liable because Russell had failed to plead
sufficient facts to establish the cause of action.252
Russell v. City of Columbia affirms the distinction between the
discretionary and ministerial functions of government officers. The
court of appeals left open the question of whether the Procedures and
Policy Manual imposed a special duty on the police officers to assist
242. Jensen v. South Carolina Dep't of Social Servs., 297 S.C. 323, 332, 377 S.E.2d
102, 107 (Ct. App. 1988).
243. Id.
244. See, e.g., Long v. Seabrook, 260 S.C. 562, 197 S.E.2d 659 (1973) (distinction
between discretionary and ministerial duties); Milligan v. South Carolina Dep't of High-
ways, 283 S.C. 59, 320 S.E.2d 505 (Ct. App. 1984) (summary judgment for defendants
affirmed because pleadings did not allege ministerial duty).
245. McCall v. Batson, 285 S.C. 243, 329 S.E.2d 741 (1985).
246. See Patel v. McIntyre, 667 F. Supp. 1131, 1140 (D.S.C. 1987).
247. Russell, - S.C. at -, 390 S.E.2d at 465.
248. Id. at -, 390 S.E.2d at 465-66; Russell, however, failed to specify what policies
were contained in the manual. Id. at , 390 S.E.2d at 466.
249. Id. at -, 390 S.E.2d at 465.
250. Id. at , 390 S.E.2d at 465-66.
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Wood.25 3 If Russell had demonstrated successfully in her pleadings
that the manual contained procedures designed to protect persons
from the kind of harm iuffered by Wood, and that Wood was a mem-
ber of the class of persons the manual intended to protect, the City
and its officers might have been liable for negligence.
Despite judicial abrogation of the doctrine of sovereign immunity
in South Carolina, under Russell police officers retain a qualified im-
munity. To hold an officer liable in negligence, one must prove the ex-
istence of either a statute or a set of circumstances creating a special
duty on the officer to act.
Anne Frances Bleecker
X. STATE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OFFICIALS ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED
PRIVILEGE IN EMPLOYEE DEFAMATION SUIT
In Wright v. Sparrow24 the South Carolina Court of Appeals held
that a state agency director's communications with two high ranking
department supervisors about an employee's performance is qualifiedly
privileged. The court granted the agency director's summary judgment
motion because the employee failed to establish actual malice, which is
required to defeat the qualified privilege as a genuine issue of material
fact.
Elizabeth Wright served as Program Coordinator for the Florence
Adult Development Center. She allegedly violated several department
policies."5 Walter Sparrow, Executive Director of the Florence County
Mental Retardation Board, discussed Wright's employment with sev-
eral board members and agency directors of the Florence County
Mental Retardation Board and with regional executives from the
South Carolina Department of Mental Retardation." 6 As a result of
these discussions, Sparrow terminated Wright's employment in Octo-
ber 1984.
Wright sued Sparrow. She alleged invasion of privacy, outrage,
and defamation in her complaint. The trial court granted Sparrow's




254. 298 S.C. 469, 381 S.E.2d 503 (Ct. App. 1989).
255. Record at 34. Wright's termination letter stated that she was terminated for (1)
failure to keep client folders current, (2) failure to make bank deposits according to pro-
cedure, and (3) failure to provide for the safety of a client.
256. Id. at 36.
257. 298 S.C. at 470, 381 S.E.2d at 504.
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The appellate court addressed the issues of summary judgment,
invasion of privacy, and outrage, but primarily focused on Wright's al-
legation of defamation.' " The trial court ruled that Sparrow had abso-
lute immunity from the defamation charge because of his status as a
state official. Wright asserted that Sparrow maliciously published false
words,
implying [she] was unfit for employment in the menital retardation
service field because she was allegedly negligent, involving the life and
safety of a mentally retarded client by locking the client in a class-
room unsupervised and by contacting an improper person to aid with
an emergency situation involving the client. 59
In defense Sparrow asserted that he had either an absolute or
qualified privileged to make statements about Wright's employment.
Assuming the falsity of Sparrow's communications for the summary
judgment motion, the trial court held that Sparrow's comments were
absolutely privileged. The court of appeals, however, held that the
comments were only qualifiedly privileged. The court decided that
Wright had failed to establish actual malice and affirmed the trial
court's grant of summary judgment.
260
The law of defamation allows immunity from liability to a person
whose communication is privileged. The law protects privileged com-
munications, categorized as either absolute or qualified, because society
believes the need for the information excuses any possible
defamation.
26 1
"When the communication is absolutely privileged, no action will
lie for its publication, no matter what the circumstances under which it
is published. '26 2 Members of the judicial or legislative branch usually
enjoy an absolute privilege.2 3 The absolute privilege gives the speaker
freedom to speak as necessary to accomplish public duties without the
chilling effect of potential liability.
South Carolina courts have recognized an absolute privilege apart
from the legislative or judicial context.26 Sparrow asserted that he had
258. Id. at 470-72, 381 S.E.2d at 504-05.
259. Id. at 473, 381 S.E.2d at 506.
260. Id. at 474, 381 S.E.2d at 507.
261. Johnson v. Independent Life & Accident Ins. Co., 94 F. Supp. 959, 962-63
(E.D.S.C. 1951). "It is the occasion, not the communication, which creates or furnishes
the privilege." Id. (citation omitted). See also W. KEETON, D. DOBSs, R. KErON, & D.
OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF ToRTs § 114, at 815-816 (5th ed. 1984).
262. Bell v. Bank of Abbeville, 208 S.C. 490, 493, 38 S.E.2d 641, 642 (1946).
263. Johnson, 94 F. Supp. at 962.
264. See id. "South Carolina has applied the doctrine of absolute privilege to several
occasions other than those comprising strictly legislative or judicial proceedings." Id.
(citing Carver v. Morrow, 213 S.C. 199, 48 S.E.2d 814 (1948) (defamation in will held
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absolute immunity because he made his remarks to protect his men-
tally retarded clients. The court, however, found that the circum-
stances warranted a qualified privilege but not an absolute privilege.261 5
A qualified privilege allows the speaker to avoid liability if his de-
famatory remarks are made without actual malice and both parties
have a common interest in the subject matter of the allegedly defama-
tory statement. This common interest may arise from the relationship
of the parties.266 If a defamatory statement is made "in good faith and
with proper motives, a defendant may claim a qualified or conditional
privilege. The privilege exists if the defendant correctly or reasonably
believes that some important interest of his own or a third person is
threatened."26 7
The qualified privilege, however, can be lost if statements are
made to an improper party. 68 Sparrow's duties as Executive Director
included reviewing and discussing employment problems with County
Mental Retardation Board members and executives. The statutory
powers of the South Carolina Mental Retardation Board include evalu-
ating mental retardation services and employing personnel.266 Sparrow
had a statutory duty to evaluate Wright's performance. He communi-
cated this evaluation in good faith to the proper parties. The court of
appeals, therefore, held that Sparrow's statements were qualifiedly
privileged.
2 70
In Bell v. Bank of Abbeville,271 a case similar to Wright, the South
Carolina Supreme Court held that members of a bank's board of direc-
tors were entitled to qualified immunity when they discussed the per-
sonnel problems of one of their bank tellers. In response to several
complaints of irregularities, the head cashier, a board member, met
with Bell. Two other board members attended this discussion of Bell's
alleged improprieties. The two remaining board members later were
told the details of the discussion. Bell sued the bank for slander. In
defense the bank claimed that the discussions with board members
privileged)); Rodgers v. Wise, 193 S.C. 5, 7 S.E.2d 517 (1940) (letter from attorney to
client held absolutely privileged); State v. Drake, 122 S.C. 350, 115 S.E. 297 (1922) (libel
in letter to Masonic Lodge held privileged).
265. Wright v. Sparrow, 298 S.C. 469, 474, 381 S.E.2d 503, 506 (Ct. App. 1989).
266. See, e.g., Woodward v. South Carolina Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 277 S.C. 29, 32,
282 S.E.2d 599, 601 (1981) (pre-trial settlement negotiations); Conwell v. Spur Oil Co.,
240 S.C. 170, 178-82, 125 S.E.2d 270, 274-76 (1962) (employer-employee relationship).
267. Abofreka v. Alston Tobacco Co., 288 S.C. 122, 125, 341 S.E.2d 622, 624 (1986)
(citing Cullum v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 228 S.C. 384, 90 S.E.2d 370 (1955)).
268. See Prentiss v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 256 S.C. 141, 147, 181 S.E.2d 325, 327
(1971) (essential elements of qualified privilege).
269. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-21-840 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
270. Wright, 298 S.C. at 474, 381 S.E.2d at 506.
271. 211 S.C. 167, 44 S.E.2d 328 (1947).
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were qualifiedly privileged because it was "a bona fide inquiry by the
employer into the alleged misconduct of the employee." '72 The su-
preme court agreed with the bank and held that the statements were
uttered in good faith in the pursuit of the business of the bank by and
to persons who had a right to hear and consider such statements, at a
time and place and in a manner and under circumstances which effec-
tually [negated] the existence of a purpose to injure and defame the
respondent .... 173
A qualifiedly privileged remark will be actionable if the remark is made
with actual malice.274 "Actual malice is ill will, recklessness, wanton-
ness, or conscious indifference to the plaintiff's rights."275 Wright al-
leged actual malice, but failed to set forth specific facts in her com-
plaint to support the allegations. 276 Sparrow's affidavit, on the other
hand, stated his reasons for making the statements and provided sup-
port which indicated that his actions were motivated not by ill will,
2
but by the belief that he was acting in the department's best
interest.
278
The court's decision in Wright is consistent with previous South
Carolina decisions in the area of employee defamation because it pro-
tects employers from liability in employment disputes.2 7 The court,
however, was not willing to transform the employer's privilege into ab-
solute immunity. Thus, when employers make defamatory remarks
with actual malice about an employee, employers will be liable for their
actions.
Marian Louise Askins
272. Id. at 172, 44 S.E.2d at 329.
273. Id. at 173, 44 S.E.2d at 330.
274. Eubanks v. Smith, 292 S.C. 57, 63, 354 S.E.2d 898, 902 (1987).
275. Id. (citing Padgett v. Sun News, 278 S.C. 26, 292 S.E.2d 30 (1982)).
276. Wright, 298 S.C. at 474, 381 S.E.2d at 506-07.
277. Record at 26-30.
278. Id. at 29.
279. See, e.g., Conwell v. Spur Oil Co., 240 S.C. 170, 125 S.E.2d 270 (1962); Bell v.
Bank of AbbeviUe, 208 S.C. 490, 38 S.E.2d 641 (1946); Moody v. McLellan, 295 S.C. 157,
367 S.E.2d 449 (Ct. App. 1988).
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